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Abstract
Higher education has experienced many changes since the 1970s, including an in-
crease in the price of college, an increase in student employment during college, a
decrease in college completion rates, and an increase in time to degree. This paper
ties these trends together by causally linking changes in financial aid with time to
degree and student employment during college. I find that additional financial aid
accelerates graduation for university seniors because they increase credits attempted
and reduce earnings while in college. In reaching this finding, I use administrative
education and earnings data to examine a discrete change in the amount of federal
financial aid available to financially independent students. The estimates in this pa-
per imply that roughly 50 percent of the observed increase in time to degree can be
explained by changes in tuition.
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1 Introduction
Attending college can have large impacts on students’ earnings as well as many other
dimensions of students’ lives.1 Moreover, students who complete college have substan-
tially higher wages than those who do not (Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013; Ost et al.,
2016). The price of college may play a key role in determining college completion due
to credit constraints and time costs of employment during college. I show that college
graduation is sensitive to the amount of financial aid students receive. I also quantify the
effect of the financial aid on earnings while in college.
This study makes two main contributions. First, it examines the effect of additional
financial aid on graduation for inframarginal students whose enrollment was not affected
by financial aid. Most existing estimates of the effect of financial aid on college comple-
tion are a combination of the effects for marginal students who were induced to enroll by
financial aid as well as for inframarginal students who received more aid but who would
have enrolled anyway. Several studies find increases in graduation associated with ad-
ditional financial aid. In the extreme, the observed increases in graduation could come
entirely from inframarginal students who did not change their initial enrollment while
all students who were induced to enroll failed to graduate. Most existing estimates can-
not rule out this extreme situation. I am able to separately identify the effect of financial
aid on inframarginal students, and I find that financial aid has a modest effect on time
to degree overall but a larger effect for lower-income students. Because most students
do not change their enrollment as a result of financial aid, the effects of financial aid on
inframarginal students are the effects of financial aid experienced by most students and
have heretofore been largely unmeasured.
Second, this study establishes that additional financial aid results in reduced earnings
while in college and increased course taking. This result is a likely mechanism for existing
1See Hoekstra (2009); Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011); Zimmerman (2014) for evidence on the effects of
college on earnings and other outcomes.
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estimates that find that college price affects graduation.
This paper lies at the intersection of three trends in higher education in the United
States. The first is a substantial increase in the price students pay for college. Since 1982,
the average amount for total tuition, fees, and room and board has increased by over 350
percent after adjusting for inflation (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013). Sec-
ond, while college enrollment rates have grown since 1970, college completion rates have
declined and time to degree has increased (Bound et al., 2010, 2012). In fact, less than 60
percent of students who begin a bachelor’s degree will finish in six years, and approx-
imately 20 percent of students who begin a two-year program will finish in three years
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2013). Last, student employment has increased
over this same time frame.2 While these trends would appear to be related, there is a
paucity of evidence that causally ties them together. I find that the price of college enroll-
ment causally affects time to degree and student labor supply, which suggests that some
of the growth in time to degree and student labor supply is likely a result of increases in
the price of college. In fact, in a back-of-the-envelope calculation, the estimates in this pa-
per imply that roughly 26-50 percent of the change in time to degree estimated by Bound
et al. (2012) can be explained by changes in net tuition.
This paper first considers the effect of additional financial aid for enrolled students on
educational outcomes including graduation, credits attempted, and grade point average
(GPA). In order to examine already enrolled students, I study an increase in financial aid
that did not change student enrollment decisions.3 The key finding is that financial aid
reduces time to graduation by increasing credits attempted.
The next section of the paper examines potential mechanisms for these results includ-
ing student labor supply and binding credit constraints. Financial aid is likely to reduce
student labor supply, and this paper estimates the effect of financial aid on student earn-
2The rise in student work has been examined in Scott-Clayton (2012), and the author concludes that
different factors have driven the growth at different times.
3The reasons for the null result of financial aid on enrollment will be discussed in Section 5.
3
ings. Most undergraduates are employed while in college—from 1989 to 2008, nearly
80 percent of undergraduates were employed.4 In fact, roughly 14 million people, or 8
percent of the United States’ total labor force, are both enrolled in formal postsecondary
training and active in the labor market (Carnevale et al., 2015). I find that financial aid
decreases earnings during college. The reduction in earnings as a result of increased fi-
nancial aid provides a likely mechanism for the improvement in student outcomes. I
also demonstrate that some students face binding credit constraint by using differences
in yearly loan maximums for dependent and independent students, another mechanism
that affects student outcomes.
To answer questions about the effect of financial aid on enrolled students’ academic
performance and labor supply, I use detailed administrative data from all public institu-
tions of higher education in Texas from academic years 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 linked
to earnings records from Texas’s Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. Students who
are 24 before January 1 are financially independent for the entire school year, whereas
students who turn 24 on January 1 or later are financially dependent. Financial indepen-
dence can induce large increases in federal financial aid such as Pell Grants as well as
federal loans. I leverage this discontinuity in the availability of financial aid in a regres-
sion discontinuity framework to isolate the effect of financial aid on student outcomes.
I show that financial independence has heterogeneous impacts on student financial aid
packages and educational outcomes depending on family income.
The change in financial aid studied in this paper occurs for older students, who are
sometimes called “nontraditional” students. However, this label may be misleading, as
over 60 percent of bachelor’s degrees granted in Texas from 2002 to 2014 were to students
who were 24 or older at the time of graduation. Older students constitute a large frac-
tion of the college-going population, as evidenced by the nationally representative 2012
National Postsecondary Aid Survey, in which 51.3 percent of all undergraduate students
4In the estimating sample of this paper, 78 percent of students are employed in the year they are enrolled
in college.
4
were classified as financially independent and 43.8 percent were 24 years or older (U.S.
Department of Education, 2013a). Not only are older students a large part of the college-
going population, they are an increasing share. In 1970, students 25 and older constituted
27.7 percent of all undergraduate enrollment, and by 2010 they accounted for 42.6 percent
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2013). Despite their growing prominence, the
response of older students to financial aid has rarely been studied.5 Financially indepen-
dent students feature prominently among federal aid recipients and made up nearly 60
percent of Pell Grant recipients in 2010–11. (U.S. Department of Education, 2013b). This
paper examines what has increasingly become the “typical” college student by focusing
on older students.
Older students are particularly relevant when considering college graduation and la-
bor supply. This study will consider university seniors who turn 24 during the school
year. These students have accumulated substantial college credit, but many do not grad-
uate in a timely manner. In fact, only 44 percent graduate in the year they turn 24. Some
never graduate, and 17.3 percent have not received a bachelor’s degree after 4 years.
These students are at the margin of graduation, and additional financial aid may enable
them to accelerate their progress toward a degree or help them complete a degree when
they otherwise would not.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will discuss the conceptual
framework and related literature. Section 3 will discuss the institutional details of finan-
cial independence. Section 4 will introduce the data used, and Section 5 will discuss how
the effect of financial aid on already-enrolled students is identified. Section 6 will present
the results of estimation and Section 7 will conclude.
5Seftor and Turner (2002) is a notable exception that will be discussed in Section 2.
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2 Conceptual Framework
2.1 Educational Outcomes
Financial aid can affect a host of education outcomes. Perhaps the most obvious is
that financial aid can affect a student’s decision to enroll in college. The general finding
is that a $1,000 reduction in the price of college increases enrollment by 2–4 percentage
points.6 Beyond enrollment, financial aid may affect persistence, graduation (Castleman
and Long, 2016), and even later outcomes like earnings (Bettinger et al., 2016) and home
ownership (Scott-Clayton and Zafar, 2016). Disentangling the effect of financial aid on en-
rollment from its effects on subsequent outcomes is difficult because financial aid changes
the composition of who goes to college. Finding a change in financial aid that has not
affected enrollment is necessary in order to uncover the effect of financial aid on longer–
term outcomes apart from changes in enrollment. In fact, most students do not change
their enrollment decision as a result of financial aid, and so focusing on the effect of finan-
cial aid for these students reveals the effect of financial aid for the majority of financial
aid recipients.
This study examines an increase in financial aid did not affect the decision to enroll
in college in the year of financial aid receipt, which allows an examination of the effect
of financial aid for already–enrolled students. Most work on the effect of financial aid
on graduation estimates an effect that combines an increase in enrollment and a potential
increase in persistence.7
Far fewer papers have examined the effect of financial aid on enrolled students. Goldrick-
Rab et al. (2016) use a randomized controlled trial to examine the effect of privately fi-
nanced, need-based aid for freshman in Wisconsin and find that increased need-based fi-
6See Deming and Dynarski (2009) for a discussion of this literature.
7For examples of papers that estimated the combined effect of financial aid on enrollment and subse-
quent outcomes see Angrist et al. (2014); Bettinger et al. (2016); Castleman and Long (2016); Cohodes and
Goodman (2014); Dynarski (2008); Scott-Clayton (2011); Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016); Sjoquist and Win-
ters (2012).
6
nancial aid increased persistence and graduation within four years. Murphy and Wyness
(2016) examine financial aid in the United Kingdom that did not affect enrollment and
find that additional financial aid increases the chances of earning a “good” degree. Rel-
ative to these studies, the current paper has the advantage of examining the U.S. federal
financial aid system. Other papers discuss the effect of financial aid on enrolled students
by making assumptions about the behavior of marginal versus inframarginal students
(Barr, 2016; Bettinger, 2015) 8
Additional financial aid may affect student outcomes such as course taking or degree
completion. Financial aid could act as a substitute for working during college, and, as
such, students might devote more time to their studies, potentially increasing credits at-
tempted, GPA, or even timely graduation. Financial aid may also decrease credit hours
taken in a semester or increase time spent in college if a student values the time spent
in college (Jacob et al., 2013). There is some evidence that higher expected prices of an
additional year of college can decrease time to graduation, which suggests that students
may value additional years in college (Garibaldi et al., 2012).9
One contribution of this study is to focus on older students. It builds off of the work
in Seftor and Turner (2002), who examine the effect of financial independence on student
enrollment and find that financial independence increases student enrollment. The cur-
rent paper also examines federal financial independence but uses a different source of
variation and detailed administrative data to consider longer-term outcomes.10
8Barr (2016) examines the effect of increased generosity for military veterans and finds that additional
aid increases graduation. The estimates in Barr (2016) represent a combination of the effect on new entrants
to college and the effect on students who would have enrolled without the increased financial aid. These
estimates, combined with an assumption about the graduation probabilities of marginal students, suggest
that some of the increase in graduation the author observes is due to increased persistence for inframarginal
students. Bettinger (2015) examines a need-based grant in Ohio and makes similar assumptions.
9Garibaldi et al. (2012) examine Bocconi University in Italy, which is notably a different setting from pub-
lic universities in the United States or, specifically, Texas. Moreover, the policies are different, as Garibaldi
et al. (2012) examine anticipated discontinuities in tuition and the present study examines changes in finan-
cial aid that are likely to be unanticipated. The differences in these settings may lead to different graduation
responses to college price.
10Seftor and Turner (2002) use a differences-in-differences framework to examine the impact of the change
the age at which students were classified as independent. They find that decreased access to federal finan-
cial aid significantly decreased college enrollment of older students using CPS data. Their findings suggest
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2.2 Mechanisms
There are at least two interrelated mechanisms by which financial aid may change
student outcomes: 1) student labor supply and 2) credit constraints.
Labor Supply
This study quantifies how much students adjust their labor supply when the price of
college decreases using administrative Unemployment Insurance earnings data linked to
higher-education administrative records. Despite the large number of students in the la-
bor force and the large amount of federal financial aid available, very few studies have
attempted to identify the effects of financial aid on student earnings. Broton et al. (2016)
use random assignment of a state need-based grant to examine student responses to sur-
vey questions about work. They find that students receiving financial aid reduced hours
worked by about 14 percent. Scott-Clayton (2011) examines the effect of a merit scholar-
ship in West Virginia that affected enrollment and finds that scholarships reduce earnings
in some specifications but not in others.11
In related work, many studies have tried to quantify the effect of working on edu-
cational outcomes. The general finding has been that working in college decreases GPA
(Kalenkoski and Pabilonia, 2010; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2003) and credits ac-
cumulated (Darolia, 2014; Triventi, 2014). These studies motivate studying the effect of
financial aid on labor supply. I find that students respond to financial aid by speeding up
graduation, increasing credits attempted, and reducing earnings while in school. The re-
that federal financial aid policy determining independence can have large effects. One potential shortcom-
ing of their paper is that the result may be driven by different trends in enrollment for the groups they
expect to be affected. Additionally, they use one change in policy that may lead to a biased estimate, par-
ticularly if other changes occur contemporaneously. Seftor and Turner (2002) also examine the effect on
students aged 21 to 23, where the present study focuses on students aged 23 and 24.
11This may be because the identification strategies measure different local average treatment effects or
because there is a bias in one or both of the estimates arising from those strategies. Also, Scott-Clayton
and Park (2015) use a regression discontinuity to examine the effect of replacing federal loans with the
Pell grants for community college students and find that grants reduce earnings and increase full-time
enrollment. However, there is a discontinuity in the density of the running variable, which suggests the
results may be biased.
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ductions in earnings and accelerated graduation are consistent with the aforementioned
prior studies on the effects of employment on student outcomes.
Credit Constraints
Financial aid may reduce time to degree because it eases binding credit constraints.
This paper estimates to what degree increased financial aid eases these constraints. Many
studies have attempted to identify whether binding credit constraints affect college en-
rollment and graduation. Early studies tended to find that credit constraints were not
prevalent (Cameron and Heckman, 1998; Cameron and Taber, 2004; Carneiro and Heck-
man, 2002; Keane and Wolpin, 2001). However, recent studies have shown borrowing
constraints matter for educational investment (Belley and Lochner, 2007; Brown et al.,
2012; Cowan, 2016; Lovenheim, 2011; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2008) .
3 Background
The U.S. federal government has several financial programs that are designed to help
students pay for college. A host of factors determine students’ eligibility for these pro-
grams, including income, assets, and family structure. A primary consideration is whether
students’ income and assets are considered separately from their parents—that is, whether
they are financially independent. This distinction between dependent and independent
students does not need to reflect actual financial dependence but rather deals with statutes
governing the amount of financial aid disbursed. This section will discuss two programs
where financial independence changes the amount of aid disbursed. The first set of pro-
grams is administered by the U.S. Department of Education, and I will refer to that set
as “federal financial aid.” The second set of programs is a part of the U.S. tax code, and I
will refer to that as “tax aid.”
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3.1 Federal Financial Aid
Federal financial aid consists of federal grants, student loans, and work study. The
largest federal grant program is the Pell Grant, which is targeted toward low-income
students. In Fiscal Year 2013 the Pell Grant cost over $33 billion and provided aid to more
than nine million students. Various federal student loans are also available to students,
and low-income students may take out loans at subsidized interest rates. In order to be
eligible for need-based financial aid, students must file a Free Application for Federal
Student Aid (FAFSA). The FAFSA requires information about student income and assets
as well as family income and assets and demographic information (such as the number
of siblings in college). This information is then fed into a complex formula to compute
eligibility for need-based federal programs. In general, the federal financial aid awards
are calculated yearly and use information for the prior year.12
Students must include parental information on their FAFSA if they are considered
financially dependent. Undergraduate students may be classified as financially indepen-
dent for several reasons, including being over 24 years old as of January 1 of the school
year, being married, having dependent children, or a few other reasons.13 When students
are independent, parental financial information is not considered, and student aid eligi-
bility increases as a result. All else being equal, independent students qualify for larger
amounts of need-based financial aid (both grants and subsidized loans) than dependent
students.
The two most prominent federal student loans available to undergraduates are sub-
sidized and unsubsidized loans. Subsidized loans have weakly better interest rates over
the time period studied than unsubsidized loans. Subsidized loans do not start accruing
interest until six months after a student leaves school. Unsubsidized loans start accru-
12This will change in the 2016–2017 school year, when students can use income data for the ”prior-prior-
year.” If a life event occurs that would change a student’s Expected Family Contribution (EFC), students
can amend their FAFSA to reflect the new information and possibly change their eligibility for Pell Grants.
13See http://studentaid.ed.gov/fafsa/filling-out/dependency for all conditions that determine indepen-
dent status.
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ing interest as soon as they are disbursed. Any student can borrow unsubsidized loans
regardless of financial need. Independent students are eligible for higher annual (and
aggregate) federal loan limits.
Independent status based on age is determined once a year. Students who are 24
or older as of January 1 will be independent for the entire school year. Students who
are 23 years old on January 1 and who meet the other conditions for dependent status
will be declared dependent for the entire year. This discontinuity creates a situation in
which students are very similar in age (and other characteristics) but are different in their
eligibility for federal financial aid. This is the institutional oddity that will be leveraged
to examine the effect of additional financial aid arising from financial independence.
3.2 Tax Aid
The United States tax code gives special treatment to dependent children. Children
can be claimed as dependents as long as they are younger than 19 at the end of the year.
If a child is a full-time student, that child may be claimed as a dependent if she is younger
than 24 at the end of the year and meets certain conditions. Those conditions are that the
child must be a full-time student for at least five months in a year, must live with her par-
ents for at least six months of the year, and must receive more than half of her financial
support from her parents. If these conditions are met, parents may claim their student
children as dependents and receive exemptions and tax credits that reduce taxable in-
come. Additionally, dependent students may qualify the taxpayer for tax credits like the
American Opportunity Credit, the Lifetime Learning Credit, and the Earned Income Tax
Credit. During the time period studied in this paper, the Hope Tax Credit and Tuition
Deduction could also be used.14
Changes in tax aid occur at the same January 1 threshold for some students. Ulti-
mately this paper will be able to identify the reduced-form effect of changes in tax aid and
14See Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2015) for a discussion on tax benefits for college.
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financial aid resulting from financial independence. However, I argue that the changes
in federal financial aid are likely to dominate changes in tax aid for several reasons. The
first is that tax aid is disbursed for the prior financial tax year no earlier than February.
This date falls after students have made extensive and intensive margin enrollment de-
cisions for both semesters, which likely limits the extent to which tax aid can influence
student outcomes. Also, both Bulman and Hoxby (2015) and Hoxby and Bulman (2015)
use administrative tax data to convincingly show that tax aid does not change whether
students enroll or what types of institutions they enroll in, which suggests that the effect
of tax aid on other student outcomes may also be small. Furthermore, a student’s tax
liability is likely to decrease as a result of the change, whereas family tax liability is likely
to decrease making the effect on student finances ambiguous. Moreover, the change in
financial independence for tax purposes is likely to affect a minority of students, as dis-
cussed in Appendix A.1. Last, federal tax aid more than doubled in 2009. As a robustness
check, I show that the results are not substantively different in the years before or after
this increase in tax aid in Table A1. For these reasons, the results of this study will largely
be interpreted as the effects of financial aid rather than of tax aid. A more complete dis-
cussion of tax aid can be found in Appendix A.1.
4 Data
The primary data for this project come from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating
Board and contain the universe of students who were enrolled in public universities in the
state of Texas from 2003–2004 to 2013–2014. The data contain demographic information
about the students including race, gender, and birth date. They also contain records on
student enrollment and credits attempted. Importantly, all financial aid disbursed by the
university is also contained in the data. Many of the fields from the FAFSA are available,
including including dependency status and Expected Family Contribution (EFC).
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I adjust all financial aid and earnings data to be in constant 2013 dollars for compa-
rability. Data from the Texas Workforce Commission’s (TWC) Unemployment Insurance
system are linked to individual student records and contain quarterly earning records.15
Importantly for this study, students employed by their college or university are not in-
cluded in reporting for the Unemployment Insurance system. However, the financial aid
data include total Federal Work-Study compensation, which is added to the UI earnings
data. Furthermore, I winsorize the wages at the ninety-ninth percentile to avoid issues
with outliers. I will discuss the implications of the unavailability of non-work-study earn-
ings at colleges in Section 6.
The sample consists of seniors who were enrolled at a public university in Texas in
the year they turned 24. However, students may respond to additional financial aid in
the year they turn 24 by changing enrollment. This is checked in Section 5 and found not
be a concern. The sample is restricted to seniors because graduation within a given time
frame is a key outcome considered, and students with different classifications would have
different relevant time frames for graduation. However, this restriction keeps the majority
of university students turning 24 during the school year, as 71.5 percent are classified as
seniors.16
Table 1 contains summary statistics for university seniors. University seniors receive
a substantial amount of financial aid, receiving $1,800 in grant money and taking out
over $3,900 in loans. Graduation is relatively common for these students, as 44 percent
of seniors who turn 24 graduate in that year and 70 percent graduate by the end of the
following year. Also, 30 percent of students received a Pell Grant in the previous year,
15The unemployment insurance records only include employers who pay at least $1,500 in gross wages
to employees in a quarter. Alternatively employers are included if the employer has at least one employee
during 20 different weeks in a calendar year, regardless of the wages.
16The restriction to seniors is akin to the standard practice of examining rising freshman. It ensures that
the outcomes considered have a similar meaning. For example graduation within one year is a relevant
outcome for seniors but is not for freshman. Moreover, since over 70 percent of students are seniors it is the
most natural group of students to examine. However, examining all students yields very similar results.
The effects on graduation are attenuated but still are marginally statistically significant. These results can
be obtained from the author upon request.
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and students attempted an average of 22 credits hours within the current year.
I focus on university students in this paper because they see much larger changes in
financial aid resulting from financial independence than do community college students.
This is likely because community college students file the FAFSA at lower rates than uni-
versity students. Results for community college students find no effect on persistence,
graduation, GPA, or earnings in college. These results are not presented but are available
upon request.
5 Identification
As previously discussed, students who are 23 years old on January 1 are counted as
dependent for the entire school year if they meet other conditions. However, students
who are 24 on January 1 are independent for the school year. I leverage the discrete nature
of the change in classification to examine the effect of additional financial aid arising
from being declared independent on student outcomes using a regression discontinuity
framework. The outcomes considered include reenrollment, graduation within a certain
number of years, credits attempted, financial aid, any employment, and earnings.
The estimating equation is:
Yi = f(a˜gei) + θ · 1(Ind > 0) +Xi + µt + it, for |a˜gei| < j, (1)
where i indexes students and t indexes school year. Yi is a student outcome, f(a˜gei)
is a flexible function of a student’s recentered age as of January 1 that will be estimated
using a local linear approximation, 1(Ind > 0) is an indicator for being 24 as of January
1, and θ is the parameter of interest and is the effect of the additional financial aid arising
from students being declared financially independent because of their age.17 Xit contains
control variables like race and gender and µt represents year fixed effects. Finally, it is
17Some students who are less than 24 will be independent for other reasons, as previously discussed.
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an idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors are clustered on a˜ge to account for correla-
tion within date of birth. (Lee and Card, 2008). This equation is estimated on a subset
of the data to compare students who are similar ages, and j is chosen using the proce-
dure outlined in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) for local linear regression discontinu-
ity frameworks though results are robust to the choice of bandwidth. Tests for sensitivity
to bandwidth will be presented in Section 6. I also examine heterogeneity by other stu-
dent characteristics including prior year Pell receipt and students who previously had a
zero EFC as a proxy for income.
Assumptions for Identification
There are two assumptions that must be made for the estimates of Equation 1 to yield
unbiased estimates of the effect of age-based financial independence. First, because the
sample is conditioned on students being 24 years old, students must not respond to ad-
ditional financial aid in the year they turn 24 by changing their decision to enroll in the
year they turn 24. Second, birth date cannot be manipulated to gain access to treatment.
If either birth date manipulation or differential enrollment occurs, this would appear as
additional students who are 24 years or older as of January 1.
If students anticipate the additional financial aid available to independent students,
they may change their enrollment or reenrollment in response to additional financial aid.
If this occurs and enrollment is affected, then conditioning the sample on students who
turn 24 will yield biased estimates that conflate the effect of additional financial aid on
enrolled students and the change in sample composition arising from additional financial
aid.
Students do not appear to alter their enrollment decisions in the year they turn 24
based on financial independence. To check for this, in Figure 2 and Table 2 I exam-
ine the re-enrollment probabilities of 23-year-old students. Because I focus on seniors,
re-enrollment is how enrollment-induced changes in financial aid would manifest them-
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selves. If financial independence altered enrollment decisions, it would appear as a dis-
crete change in the re-enrollment probabilities of 23–year–old students. The estimated
change in re-enrollment probability for students who will receive additional financial is
0.0025 with a standard error of 0.006. The lack of an enrollment effect is seen in Figure 2.
This can also be seen in Figure 1, Panel B, in which there is no discontinuity in the density
of students enrolling in the year they turn 24.
The lack of a response may be because the age rule governing independent status and
the consequence of financial independence are not widely known. It may also be that
older students who have typically accumulated substantial credits do not change their
reenrollment based on financial aid. Given that there is no measured effect on reenroll-
ment, I continue to condition the sample on enrollment in the year a student turns 24.
This lack of an (re)enrollment effect allows an examination of the effect of financial aid on
student outcomes apart from enrollment effects.
A second assumption for identification is that birth date is not manipulated to gain
access to the financial independence. Obviously, a student’s true birth date is not manip-
ulable by the student. Students do have incentives to misreport their birth date to gain
additional dollars, but the reported birth date is verified by comparison with Social Se-
curity Administration records. Students cannot manipulate their birth date, but parents
may manipulate their child’s birth date. There is evidence that birth dates are manip-
ulated around January 1 by parents in response to tax incentives (LaLumia et al., 2015;
Schulkind and Shapiro, 2014). This issue is discussed in Appendix Section A.2 and found
to likely affect only a very small number of students born within a few days of January 1.
To avoid any issues associated with potential retiming of births, the preferred specifi-
cation will be a regression discontinuity “donut” estimator (Almond and Doyle, 2011), in
which the three days on either side of January 1 are omitted. The results are quantitatively
and qualitatively very similar if those three days are included; these results are presented
in Appendix Table A2.
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Additionally Section A.3 and Table A3 confirm that student characteristics do not
change discontinuously at the threshold.
Because of three qualifying conditions—1) there is no change in reenrollment proba-
bilities for 23-year-olds, 2) students are unable to manipulate their date of birth, and 3)
observed covariates do not vary discretely by eligibility status—the testable assumptions
of the regression discontinuity estimator are met and the results can be interpreted as the
causal impact of age-based financial independence on student outcomes.
6 Results
Educational Outcomes
University students see substantial changes in financial aid arising from financial in-
dependence. This is documented in Figure 3 and Table 3. Students who are financially
independent appear on the right of the figures and receive an additional $930 in grant dol-
lars, the bulk of which comes in the form of increased Pell Grants ($807). They also take
out an additional $865 in federal loans. Between grants and loans, this represents a sig-
nificant change to student finances totaling over $1,795. One important caveat is that the
data do not contain private loans. Federal loans typically offer better interest rates than
private loans and offer access to a variety of repayment plans generally unavailable in
the private market, including income-based repayment, income-contingent repayment,
graduated repayment, or extended repayment. As a result, some of the increase in the
amount of federal loans could be students switching from private loans to federal loans.
Federal loans are by far the most common type of loans, and private student loans make
up about 10 percent of student debt issued since 2009 (College Board , 2015). If finan-
cial independence induced switching from private loans to federal loans, the estimated
increase in loan aid would overstate the degree to which students borrowed additional
money.
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This large change in financial aid allows an examination of whether student outcomes
are affected by financial aid. The effect on student outcomes are presented in Figure 4
and Table 3. Financial independence increases student credit hours attempted by 0.39. In
attempting more credits, students could see their GPA decrease if they do not change the
time devoted to studying. However, in spite of this larger class load, the student GPAs are
unaffected, with an estimated discontinuity of 0.001 and a 95 percent confidence interval
of –0.024 to 0.026. The additional financial aid increased student credits attempted but
did not reduce performance in those credits.
Because seniors are attempting more credits and GPA is unaffected, graduation has the
potential to be affected. This is seen in Figure 4 and in Table 3. Students are 1.8 percent-
age points more likely to graduate in the year they turn 24 (in the tables this is designated
“Grad in 0y”) as a result of additional financial aid. This discontinuity is clearly visible in
the figure and is statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level. There is an accom-
panying dip in the probability of enrolling in the next year, which provides evidence that
financial aid causes some students to graduate and not enroll in the next year.
Students are more likely to graduate in the year they turn 24. This could either be a
result of retiming graduation by encouraging students to graduate earlier than they oth-
erwise would have, or it could arise from students graduating who otherwise would not.
To investigate this graduation in either the year students turn 24 or the year afterward is
considered. The estimated coefficient (“Grad 4yr in 1y” in the table) is 0.002, which sug-
gests that additional financial aid retimed graduations rather than induced graduation
among students who not otherwise have graduated.
While there is a positive effect on graduation in the year the money is received, it is
relatively small. The 1.8 percentage point increase represents a 4 percent increase in the
graduation rate. The increase comes at a cost of $930 in grants. Assuming that all of
the graduation effects are driven by grants, it costs $53,125 in grants for one student to
graduate one year earlier. The cost would be even higher after accounting for additional
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subsidies received for loans. College enrollees in the sample earn $12,219, and students
who graduate in the year they turn 24 earn $26,923 in the year they turn 25. This means
that graduating a year earlier corresponds to roughly a $14,704 difference in earnings.
However, for the sample taken as a whole the benefits of an additional year in the labor
market do not exceed the costs associated with one student graduating a year earlier. I
will explore whether additional financial aid is cost effective by exploring students with
different levels of income in Section 6.
Mechanisms
Labor Supply during College
I now investigate mechanisms for the increased credits attempted and reduced time
to degree, including reduced time spent working during college and binding credit con-
straints.
Additional financial aid may allow students to reduce time spent working. Using
Unemployment Insurance earnings data, in Figure 5 I explore whether students who are
declared financially independent based on age change their earnings in response to the
additional grants and loans they receive. Financially independent university students
do not adjust the probability of positive earnings. The coefficient on whether students
have positive earnings is –0.5 percentage points with a standard error of 0.5 percentage
points. This rules out reasonably small reductions in the probability of earnings up to –1.5
percentage points. Despite no change in the probability of working, there is significant
change in earnings during college seen in Figure 5, Panel B. Students who are financially
independent by age see their earnings decrease by $529. Focusing only on students who
have positive earnings yields a similar estimate of $576. This represents about 30 percent
of the increase in grants and loans, or 55 percent of the increase in grants. Financial aid
crowds out earning by reducing labor supply on the intensive margin but does not seem
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to affect extensive margin labor supply.
Interpreting the estimates of the effect of additional financial aid on earnings requires
caution, because earnings for students employed by the university they attend are not in-
cluded in UI earnings records unless the student is employed as part of the federal work-
study program. There is further discussion of on-campus employment in Appendix Sec-
tion A.4, but if anything, the lack of on-campus, non-work-study earnings likely results
in an underestimate of the effect of financial aid on earnings.
Unfortunately, in this setting, it is impossible to completely disentangle the effect of
additional eligibility for student loans from the effect of additional grant money on earn-
ings. In the section on heterogeneous effects by family income, I will examine groups of
students who saw small (or no) increases in grants and larger increases in loans to see if
there are differences by the type of aid received. Overall, the evidence suggests that stu-
dents reduce earnings when receiving additional financial aid. Given the earlier results
on completion, the findings on earnings support the idea that working during college
slows down time to degree.
Binding Credit Constraints
Easing binding credit constraints may be one mechanism that induced earlier gradu-
ation. Independent students have access to higher yearly and aggregate federal student
loan limits than do dependent students. This provides an opportunity to test for credit
constraints among enrolled college students. Specifically, how does financial indepen-
dence affect the number of students borrowing above the amount that would be allowed
had they been born a few days earlier? Two potential estimates exist. First, how many
students were borrowing exactly the maximum amount, and how did this change with
access to higher loan amounts? Second, how many independent students are borrowing
above the maximum for dependent students? Both of these estimates should capture the
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number of students who are credit constrained.18
Figure 3 and Table 3 investigate this question. Panel C of Figure 3 shows that inde-
pendence causes a 5 percent reduction in the number of students borrowing exactly at
the dependent maximum. However, there is an accompanying increase of 15 percent of
students who borrow more than the dependent maximum. Combining this result with
the number of students borrowing exactly the maximum suggests that access to higher
loan maximums induces 10 percent of students who would not borrow at the lower max-
imum to borrow above the lower maximum when given the chance. This result represents
somewhat of a puzzle.
Colleges have latitude in the way they package federal loans in financial aid packages.
Universities often package the maximum amount of loans that a student qualifies for. The
observed increase is consistent with students being offered higher amounts of loans and
accepting that offer (Marx and Turner, 2016). Unfortunately it is impossible to know
exactly what caused this odd result, but behavioral explanations seem likely. However,
both estimates suggest that easing binding credit constraints is a likely mechanism for
increased hours attempted and decreased time to degree.
There are two important caveats for the estimation of the number of students who
are credit constrained, private loans and changes in grant aid. As previously discussed,
federal loans are the bulk of the market for student loans and are more attractive. As
a result, students are likely to exhaust their federal loan eligibility before turning to the
private loan market. In the 2012 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), 9.6
percent of students who reported taking out less than the statutory maximum of federal
student loans reported having taken out private loans, which suggests that nearly all
students will exhaust federal student loan eligibility before taking out private loans.
Financial independence not only changes the maximum amount of loans students
have access to but increases grants and eligibility for subsidized loans. To partially ad-
18Any student, regardless of assessed financial need, may borrow the maximum amount of federal un-
subsidized loans as long as the amount of loans does not exceed unmet financial need.
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dress this issue, I will examine students who had received a Pell Grant or a zero EFC in the
previous year in the section on heterogeneity. These students see smaller (or no) changes
in grants and subsidized loans, and as a result, looking at them can be more informative
of what might happen if subsidized loans and grants were unchanged. The results are
not substantively different for this group of students.
Heterogeneity
I examine heterogeneity by a measure of parental income, which affects the size of the
change in financial aid. In Table 4, separate discontinuities are estimated for three groups
of students: 1) students who had a zero EFC when they were 23 years old, 2) students
who received a Pell grant when they were 23 years old, and 3) students who did not
receive a Pell Grant when they were 23 years old. These groups are examined separately
because changes in financial aid arising from age-induced financial independence are
quite different based on family income.
Students who previously received a zero EFC are examined in Column 1 of Table 4 and
see no change in grants or subsidized loans. These are the neediest students in the sample,
and so the exclusion of parental income and assets does not affect their eligibility for
grants or subsidized loans. However, these students do increase unsubsidized borrowing
by $842. Despite only seeing an increase in unsubsidized student loans, age-induced
financial independence causes 4 percent of students to speed up graduation by one year.
Students with a previously received a zero EFC appear to reduce earnings by roughly the
same amount as the sample as a whole at $566, but this is imprecisely estimated with a
t-statistic of 1.55. The reduction in earnings is 65 percent of the increase in loans. The
larger effects on educational outcomes is somewhat surprising given the lack of a change
in grants. However, the increased loans are likely to help these students most, as they
are the neediest in the sample. These estimates also demonstrate the academic benefits of
increased access to student loans for the poorest students.
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Students who previously received a zero EFC can be helpful in understanding how
many students are credit constrained because they experience no change in grants or
subsidized loans as a result of age-induced financial independence. The two estimates of
credit constraints are very similar to before: there is a 4.9 percent decrease in the number
of students borrowing at the unsubsidized max and a 16.3 percent increase in the num-
ber of students borrowing above the dependent unsubsidized maximum. These students
are the neediest in the sample so we would expect a higher fraction of them to be credit
constrained as compared to the overall population. Despite this sample change, the es-
timates on the number of enrolled students who are credit–constrained are very similar
to the estimates for the whole sample and confirm that the number of credit–constrained
students ranges from 5–16 percent.
The second column examines students who received a Pell Grant when they were 23.19
These students see a $402 increase in grants, a $125 increase in subsidized loans, and a
$854 increase in unsubsidized loans for age-induced changes in financial independence.
They are slightly more likely to graduate than the full sample as a result of financial aid,
with 2.85 percent graduating one year earlier. They also reduce earnings and appear to
be credit constrained at similar rates to the sample as a whole.
The third column of Table 4 examines students who did not receive a Pell Grant when
they were 23 years old. These students are wealthier, so excluding parental income in-
duces larger changes in need-based financial aid. They see a $1,165 increase in grants, a
$755 increase in subsidized loans, and no change in unsubsidized loans. Despite a much
larger change in financial aid, the effect on time to degree is smaller, with 1.3 percent
reducing time to degree by one year. They reduce earnings by $535 and have similar
estimates to the sample as a whole for credit constraints.
The heterogeneity analysis shows that the cost of reducing time to degree by one year
varies substantially by family income. For students who had previously received an EFC
19Students with a zero EFC in the year they turned 23 are a subset of this sample.
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of zero, there is no direct cost from grants or subsidized loans. The increase in unsub-
sidized loans for independent students reduces time to graduation. Essentially, this de-
creased time to degree (and increased time in the labor market) comes at no cost. For
students who had previously received a Pell Grant, an additional $14,119 in grants de-
creases time to degree by one year.20 This very similar to how much more graduates in
the sample make as compared to students enrolled in college. For students who had pre-
viously received a Pell Grant, additional grant aid is likely to be efficient, as its cost is
roughly equal to the gain in earnings that a student sees from an additional year in the
labor market. For students who had not previously received a Pell Grant, reducing time
to degree costs $92,492 which is substantially more costly than the benefit of an additional
year in the labor market.
Taken together, the results on heterogeneity by previous Pell receipt suggest a few
things: Financial independence gives more resources to relatively wealthier students. De-
spite this, the reduced time to graduation seems to be larger for needier students. In fact,
aid to students who qualified for the Pell Grant in the year they turned 23 is likely to be
efficient, as the benefits to the students are less than or equal to the costs. These results
on heterogeneity highlight the educational attainment benefits of targeting financial aid
to the neediest students.
Robustness
Two additional robustness checks are performed to make sure the results are not spu-
rious. The first is to check the choice of bandwidth and is presented in Figure 6. This
figure considers a main result of the paper, which finds that students who are financially
independent and receive additional financial aid are more likely to graduate in the year
they receive the aid and reduce their earnings. Each of the dots represents an estimated
discontinuity, along with 95 percent confidence intervals for different bandwidth choices.
20This abstracts from the costs of subsidized loans or program administration costs.
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For graduation in the year students turn 24, the estimate is stable across bandwidths and
is statistically different from zero starting with the bandwidth of 80 days. For earnings,
smaller bandwidths tend to deliver smaller estimates, but once the bandwidth includes
90 days it is statistically different from zero. These figures confirm that the estimate is not
sensitive to the choice of bandwidth.
I also use students turning 22 as a placebo exercise to see if student outcomes system-
atically vary at January 1. These results are presented in Table A4 and are discussed in
Appendix Section A.5. If students anticipated the change in financial aid, we would likely
see changes in student outcomes for these students. However, student outcomes do not
significantly differ at this same threshold for 22-year-olds.
Contribution to Trends
The price of college has increased dramatically over the past 40 years. Concurrently,
there has been an increase in time to degree and student employment. This paper shows
that financial aid has a causal effect on time to degree and student employment. I use
data from the College Board to get average tuition in the United States in 1974–1975 and
1992–1993. Tuition roughly doubles during this time frame. Bound et al. (2012) estimate
a 0.27 year increase in time to degree for the high school graduating class of 1992 as com-
pared to 1972. They link this to increased time working through a decomposition exercise
and assumptions about the time spent working but note that student employment is en-
dogenous to many things that are changing over the time frame. This paper can be used
to help answer how much of the observed change in time to degree can be explained by
changes in the price of college?
In a back-of-the-envelope exercise, I find that net tuition changed by $2,119 annually
in 1992 dollars. For details on data sources and assumptions see Appendix Section A.6.
The change in grants in this paper is $559 in 1992 dollars. This implies that the change in
tuition over this time would predict a 0.27 year increase in time to degree, or 100 percent
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of increased time to degree. Several caveats apply to this exercise. First, the measure
of net tuition is imperfect, as it is average sticker tuition minus average Pell amount.21
Second, while these estimates are internally valid, there is the question about how well
they extend to all students. Third, the 100 percent estimate attributes all of the change in
time to degree to a change in grants even though loan amounts also changed. If half of
the effect operated through increased loans (the change is loans is roughly equal in size
to the change in grants), then the estimate would be a 0.135 change in time to degree, or
roughly 50 percent of the observed change in years to degree. If instead of net tuition I
simply use sticker tuition, the estimates in this paper still account for 26 percent of the
observed change. In any case, the change in time to degree implied by the change in price
is nonnegligible.
This exercise illustrates that while the point estimates may not seem large, they explain
a significant portion of an important trend in higher education.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper causally links three trends in higher education: 1) higher tuition, 2) increas-
ing time to degree, and 3) increased earnings in college. In particular, the price of college
causally increases time to degree and increases student labor supply. The effects of col-
lege price on inframarginal students are important because they affect many students and
are implicitly included in every financial aid and tuition policy considered but are rarely
measured.
Several policy lessons emerge from this paper. First, proposals to change tuition or
financial aid should consider the implications of their decisions on time to degree. In fact,
this may be the bulk of the effect, as changes in price are likely to induce relatively small
changes in enrollment while affecting all enrolled students. Moreover, roughly 50 percent
21Data on net tuition is generally not available until much later. The College Board now collects careful
information on net tuition but did not in 1974.
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of the increased time to degree and increased student employment of the last 30 years is
likely due to increases in the price of college.
Second, the change in financial aid associated with financial independence is poorly
targeted. The largest increases in aid go to students who come from the most affluent
backgrounds. As a result, the benefits from the change in independence (namely one
additional year in the labor market) do not outweigh the costs for the sample as a whole.
However, for poorer students who see smaller changes in aid, the effects on time to degree
are comparatively larger. For students who had previously had a zero EFC, time to degree
is reduced simply by allowing additional borrowing of unsubsidized loans.
The heterogeneous effects of financial aid by family income underscore how targeting
financial aid to needier students improves student outcomes relative to aid for wealthier
students. This is particularly important for evaluating policy that reduces the price of
college for all students.
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8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Density of Birth Dates
(a) 4yr (b) 4yr Donut
NOTE: Panel A plots the number of students born on each day of the year, and Panel B
replicates that plot but removes students born within three days of January 1. The data
come from administrative records of the THECB and include the 2003–2004 to 2013–2014
school years.
Figure 2: Reenrollment of 23-year-olds
NOTE: This figure plots the fraction of 23-year-olds who re-enroll in the year they turn 24
by their recentered birth date. The data come from administrative records of the THECB
and include the 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 school years.
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Figure 3: Four-Year Colleges, Financial Aid
(a) Grants (b) Loans
(c) Borrow at Unsub. Max (d) Borrow More than Unsub. Max
NOTE: Panel A plots the average amount of grants received by students by their age
as of January 1. Panel B plots the amount of loans taken out by the students by their
age as of January 1 and Panel C plots the fraction of students who borrow the annual
federal maximum for dependent students. Panel D plots the fraction of students who
borrow above the annual federal maximum for dependent students. Each dot represents
the average for a group of 10 birth dates. The size of the dot is proportional to the number
of students for which the average is computed. The data are from administrative records
of the THECB and include the 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 school years.
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Figure 4: Four-Year Colleges, Educational Outcomes
(a) Hours Attempted (b) Grad this Year
(c) Re Enroll Next Year (d) Grad Next Year
NOTE: Panel A plots the number of credit hours attempted by student age as of January
1. Panel B plots the probability of graduating in the year a student turns 24 by birth date.
Panel C plots the probability of reenrolling in the year after a student turns 24 by birth
date. Panel D plots the probability of graduating by the year after a student turns 24 by
birth date. Each dot represents the average for a group of 10 birth dates. The size of the
dot is proportional to the number of students for which the average is computed. The
data are from administrative records of the THECB and include the 2003–2004 to 2013–
2014 school years.
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Figure 5: Four-Year Colleges, Earnings Outcomes
(a) Employment (b) Earnings
NOTE: Panel A plots the fraction of students with nonzero earnings in the year they turn
24 by their age as of January 1. Panel B plots earnings by birth date. The size of the dot
is proportional to the number of students for which the average is computed. The data
come from administrative records of the TWC and include the 2003–2004 to 2013–2014
school years.
Figure 6: Bandwidth Sensitivity, University Students
(a) Graduation (b) Earnings
NOTE: The estimated discontinuity is plotted with 95% confidence intervals when esti-
mated with different bandwidths. Panel A plots the effect of independence on graduation
in the year students turn 24. Panel B plots the estimate of independence on earnings. The
data are from administrative records of the TWC and THECB and include the 2003–2004
to 2013–2014 school years.
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Table 1: Summary Stats
University Seniors
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Male 227,848 0.49 0.50
White 227,848 0.49 0.50
Black 227,848 0.10 0.30
Hispanic 227,848 0.30 0.46
Asian 227,848 0.05 0.21
Hours 227,848 22.09 10.36
Borrow at unsub max 227,848 0.06 0.24
Borrow at sub max 227,848 0.12 0.32
Enroll next year 227,848 0.46 0.50
Graduate, current year 227,848 0.44 0.50
Graduate by next year 227,848 0.70 0.46
GPA 227,848 2.70 0.97
Receive Pell last year 227,848 0.30 0.46
Borrow more unsub max 227,848 0.17 0.38
Positive earnings 227,848 0.79 0.41
Total grants 227,848 1,838.90 2,668.65
Pell 227,848 1,449.75 2,111.77
Total loans 227,848 3,904.35 4,936.33
Earnings 227,848 12,218.71 12,908.41
NOTE: Summary statistics for the sample of students at Texas public universities and
community colleges from 2003 to 2013 who are within 200 days of turning 24 during
the school year. The data are from administrative records of the THECB and TWC and
include the 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 school years.
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Table 2: Reenrollment Probability of 23-Year-Old Students
Reenroll
Discontinuity 0.0025
(0.0065)
Observations 121,333
NOTE: This table estimates the change in the probability of reenrolling in the next school
year for students who turn 23 during the current school year. Students born December 29
through January 3, are excluded as discussed in the text. The discontinuity is estimated
using a window of birth dates of 100 days from January 1, which corresponds to the IK
bandwidth. Standard errors are clustered on recentered birth date and are in parentheses,
with * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: Estimated Discontinuities
Total grants Pell amount Unsub. loans Sub. loans
Discontinuity 929.7*** 806.9*** 304.6*** 561.8***
(28.15) (20.51) (36.46) (27.72)
Observations 111,793 111,793 111,793 111,793
Att. hours Grad in 0 yr Grad in 1 yr Reenroll GPA
Discontinuity 0.389*** 0.018*** 0.002 -0.015** 0.001
(0.088) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012)
Observations 223,772 111,793 111,793 111,793 111,793
Earnings >0 Earnings Nonzero Borrow at Borrow
earnings unsub. max unsub. max
Discontinuity -0.005 -528.6*** -575.9*** -0.052*** 0.149***
(0.005) (185.1) (214.6) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 111,793 111,793 88,104 111,793 111,793
NOTE: Each column has an estimate of the discontinuity in student outcomes for students
born before January 1. The estimates arise from estimating Equation 1. The regressions
also include controls for gender and race. Each discontinuity is estimated using a win-
dow of birth dates of 100 days around January 1. This bandwidth corresponds to the IK
bandwidth except in the case of attempted hours, where a bandwidth of 200 days is used.
Students born December 29 through January 3 are excluded, as discussed in the text. The
data are administrative records of the THECB and TWC and include the 2003–2004 to
2013–2014 school years. Standard errors are clustered on recentered birth date and are in
parentheses, with * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity Analysis
Previous Previous No previous
0 EFC Pell Pell
Total grants -69.81 402.4*** 1165.4***
(92.87) (57.28) (25.98)
Unsub. loans 842.5*** 854.2*** 55.39
(79.33) (58.12) (42.05)
Sub loans 60.59 125.8** 755.5***
(74.04) (57.88) (27.32)
Grad in 0 yr 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.013*
(0.0137) (0.011) (0.008)
Grad in 1 yr 0.013 0.009 -0.001
(0.015) (0.011) (0.006)
GPA 0.026 0.021 -0.008
(0.030) (0.021) (0.013)
Earnings -566.2 -533.4** -547.5**
(364.5) (267.0) (217.7)
Borrow
at unsub. max -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.051***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Borrow > unsub. max 0.163*** 0.174*** 0.137***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.005)
Observations 18,994 33,845 77,948
NOTE: Each entry is an estimate of the discontinuity in student outcomes for students
born before January 1. The estimates arise from estimating Equation 1. The rows rep-
resent different outcomes and the columns represent different estimating samples based
on student characteristics in the year they turn 23. The regressions also include controls
for gender and race. Each discontinuity is estimated using a window of birth dates of
100 days from January 1. Students born December 29 through January 3 are excluded
as discussed in the text. The data are administrative records of the THECB and TWC
and include the 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 school years. Standard errors are clustered on
recentered birth date and are in parentheses, with * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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A Appendix
A.1 Changes resulting from Tax Aid
Dependent status for tax purposes changes for a minority of students. In particular,
students must live at home for at least six months and provide less than half of their own
support. An upper bound on the number of students experiencing a change in depen-
dency status for tax purposes can be gleaned from the 2007–2008 National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study. The NPSAS contains information students’ residence with parents
while they are enrolled. Students at four-year schools in Texas who are from 23.5 to 24.5
years old on January 1 live with their parents 15.0 percent of the time (U.S. Department
of Education, 2013a). This number is an upper bound on the number of students affected
by the change in tax status, because some of those who live at home may receive less than
half of their support from their parents.
If a student is declared independent, all else being equal, the parent’s tax liability will
increase, as they no longer can claim a dependent exemption or any of the education
tax credits. If parents were eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), they are
likely to see EITC benefits decrease, as the number of eligible children will be reduced.
The students will have their personal tax liability decrease, as they will be able to use
the education tax credits on their tax return instead of their parents’ using the education
tax credits. In general, the family’s total tax liability will weakly increase as credits or
deductions are shifted from parents with relatively high marginal tax rates to students
with relatively low marginal tax rates.22
Financial independence is associated with (weakly) reduced family tax aid but in-
creased student tax aid. How this affects total resources toward college depends on
how parents and older students split changes in wealth from marginal tax changes. I
am not aware of any studies that examine how families split such tax changes, and data
22For very high income families who are not eligible for education tax credits, the total tax burden may
decrease, as students will become eligible for tax credits.
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on within-family transfers would be required to answer the question. Tax aid is never
“disbursed” per se, and households may differ in the timing of realizing tax benefits.
One test for the impact of tax credits for college is to consider the time before the
large expansion of tax credits that occurred in 2009. Tax expenditures increased by 140
percent in 2009. Results from 2003–2004 to 2007–2008 are presented in Table A1 and do
not vary substantially from the results presented for all years, except for the expected loss
for precision. While imperfect, this test shows that more than doubling the generosity of
the tax credits for college does not substantially effect the interpretation of the results.
A.2 Birth Retiming
LaLumia et al. (2015) and Schulkind and Shapiro (2014) find that there is a small
amount of manipulation in response to tax incentives that is less than half the amount
of retiming of births that is typically seen on a weekend. A $1,000 change in taxes leads
to about 1 percent of births being retimed.23 This may be a concern for identification if
children of parents who retime their births in response to tax incentives produce children
who systematically respond differently to financial independence 24 years later. It is not
obvious how these students would differ systematically, but it is a possibility.
To explore the amount of retiming of births or differential reenrollment that occurs,
Figure 1 plots the number of students with each birthday among students turning 24 in a
given school year for community college students and university seniors. The panels on
the left include all students. Panels on the right remove students who were born within
three days of January 1, and the distribution is much more smooth through the cutoff.
There is some retiming of births evident, but the distribution appears to be smooth after
removing the three days surrounding January 1.24
23Schulkind and Shapiro (2014) find that the manipulation is due to increased cesarean rates before Jan-
uary 1.
24There does appear to be a decrease in births associated with Christmas, though that is unlikely to be
problematic for the identification strategy.
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A.3 Student Characteristics
If either differential (re)enrollment or birth retiming were an issue, student observed
and unobserved characteristics may discretely vary across the threshold.25 I test for ob-
servable differences by looking for discontinuities in predetermined characteristics like
race, gender, grant aid received in the previous year, loans received in the previous year,
and EFC for students who had filed a FAFSA in the previous year. Results from these
checks for balance of the covariates are found in Table A3. In these regressions there
are eight discontinuities considered; one is statistically significant at the 10 percent level,
and the estimated discontinuities are small. A joint test for significance reveals that the
discontinuities in characteristics are not jointly different from zero. Overall, the lack of
discontinuities in predetermined covariates suggests that students on either side of the
age discontinuity are similar in observable characteristics.
A.4 On-Campus Employment
Work-study is a need-based federal program in which wage subsidies are offered to
universities to employ students, typically on campus (Scott-Clayton and Minaya, 2014).
Financial independence increases a student’s eligibility for work-study because parents’
income and assets are excluded from need calculations. However, the earnings measure
in this study includes student earnings from work-study, which eliminates this as a con-
cern.26 There is still the issue of non-work-study employment at universities and colleges.
Employment on campus is a small fraction of employment for students age 23.5 to 24.5.
In fact, only 8.1 percent of students at public four-year universities work on campus or
25There may be unobserved variables that also differ on each side of the age cutoff. One example that
may be relevant is insurance coverage. In the state of Texas during this time frame employers were required
to cover dependent children with health insurance until age 25, so insurance status is not likely to vary
discretely at this threshold (Dillender, 2014). Starting in 2011, the Affordable Care Act mandated that all
children under the age of 26 be eligible for inclusion on their parents’ plans, which would not affect the
identification strategy of this paper.
26Turning 24 is associated with a very small increase in student earnings from work study.
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both on and off campus.27
If financial aid displaces non-work-study employment at colleges and universities in
the same way that it does for employment observed in the UI data, then the UI earnings
will understate the true effect of financial aid on earnings. This is because there are ad-
ditional reductions in earnings for students who turn 24 that are not captured by UI and
work-study data. If non-work-study employment by universities is insensitive to finan-
cial aid, then the estimates in the UI data will be accurate. For the estimates presented
to overestimate the effect of financial aid on earnings, an unusual result is required in
which students respond to additional financial aid from turning 24 by reducing hours
worked off campus and increasing non-work-study hours worked on campus. However,
this unusual situation seems less plausible, since work-study earnings are accounted for
and there is no other clear mechanism that would drive student behavior in this way.
A.5 Placebo—22 years old
One concern is that students born before and after January 1 are unobservably differ-
ent and have differential outcomes as a result of these differences rather than differences
in financial aid. One way to test this is to perform a placebo test with students turning
22. I perform the same analysis as before, but instead use students who are turning 22 in
a school year. These students do not experience any differential change in financial aid if
they are 22 by January 1 and so the students should have the same outcomes irrespective
of whether they are 22 by January 1 unless there are some unobserved underlying differ-
ences.28 This is exactly what is found in Table A4, in which discontinuities are estimated
and none are significant the 5 percent level.
27Author’s calculations based on the 2012 NPSAS. Additionally, 5.4 percent of students work exclusively
on campus, and 2.7 percent work both on an off campus.
28Students turning 22 are chosen because students who are 23 may be looking ahead to the next year and
financial independence (or lack thereof) and adjusting their schooling decisions accordingly. There is no
evidence of this occurring, but I focus on turning 22 out of caution
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A.6 Time to Degree
Data on college tuition come from the College Board (College Board, 1998). Data on
the enrollees come from NCES (National Center for Education Statistics, 2015). Data on
the Pell Grant come from the Department of Education (U.S. Department of Education,
1993). All of the dollar amounts that follow are in 1992 dollars. To perform this exercise,
I construct a crude measure of net tuition. I start by using the published tuition from the
College Board. I then use data from the Department of Education on the average Pell
Grant disbursed in the relevant years to Pell recipients. I multiply this by the number
of Pell recipients and then divide by the total number of enrollees in higher education
to get the average Pell Grant received including zeroes. This is an imperfect measure of
total grants, but it does capture the largest source of federal grants. I then calculate net
tuition by subtracting the average Pell Grant from the average tuition. In 1992 the net
tuition was $1842 and the net tuition in 1974–1975 was -$277. This number was negative
in 1974–1975 because the Pell Grant in those years was designed to cover 100 percent of
cost of attendance. Hence the change in net tuition was $2,119. I take this number and
divide by the measured change in tuition in this paper, $559, and multiply by the size of
the effect, 0.018. Last, I multiply this by 4 because this is annual tuition and at least four
years are required for graduation. This yields a increase in time to degree of 0.27 years.
This is 100 percent of the change in time to degree estimated in Bound et al. (2012).
An important caveat is that financial independence changed not only net tuition by
changing grants but also changed loans. The change in loans is about the same mag-
nitude as the change in grants. Unfortunately it is not clear how much of the effect on
graduation to attribute to loans or grants. Conservatively, if half of the change in grad-
uation is attributable to grants and half to loans (matching the proportional change in
amounts) then the estimate would shrink to 0.135 years, or 50 percent of the observed
change in time to degree in Bound et al. (2012). Loans are likely to have a smaller effect
than grants because they must be repaid. Hence, assuming that loan aid and grant aid
46
have the same effect is conservative.
The implied change in time to degree is smaller if sticker tuition is used instead of net
tuition. This is largely because net tuition incorporates both the change in sticker tuition
and the decline in the Pell Grant as a fraction of tuition that occurred from 1974 to 1993.
As a result, this should be seen as a more conservative exercise than when accounting for
Pell Grants. If sticker tuition is used, the implied change in time to degree is 0.14 years, or
52 percent of the observed change. After conservatively accounting for half of the effect
being loans, this would still be 26 percent of the observed change in time to degree.
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Table A1: Results Pre-2008
Total grants Pell amount Unsub. loans Sub. loans
Discontinuity 813.3*** 684.4*** 275.2*** 614.5***
(41.36) (28.56) (36.96) (39.12)
Observations 57,611 57,611 57,611 57,611
Att. hours 4 yr Grad in 0 yr Grad in 1 yr Reenroll GPA
Discontinuity 0.210 0.0157* -0.007 -0.016* -0.013
(0.136) (0.009 ) (0.0008) (0.009) (0.018)
Observations 114,820 57,611 57,611 57,611 57,611
Earnings>0 Earnings Nonzero Borrow at Borrow >
earnings unsub. max unsub. max
Discontinuity -0.00957 -554.3** -426.4 -0.070*** 0.139***
(0.00728) (247.5) (282.3) (0.005) (0.007)
Observations 57,611 57,611 46,887 57,611 57,611
NOTE: Each column has an estimate of the discontinuity for a student outcome for stu-
dents born before January 1. The sample only includes students in 2003–2004 to 2006–
2007, in order to focus on a time with smaller available tax aid. The estimates arise
from estimating Equation 1. The regressions also include controls for gender and race.
Students born December 29 through January 3 are excluded, as discussed in the text.
Each discontinuity is estimated using a window of birth dates of 100 days from January
1, which corresponds to the IK bandwidth. The data are administrative records of the
THECB and TWC and include the 2003-2004 to 2013–2014 school years. Standard errors
are clustered on recentered birthdate and are in parentheses, with * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***
p<0.01.
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Table A2: Estimated Discontinuities, No Donut
Total grants Pell amount Unsub. loans Sub. loans
Discontinuity 925.2*** 799.6*** 306.3*** 559.4***
(29.99) (23.37) (29.15) (27.03)
Observations 115,869 115,869 115,869 115,869
Att. hours 4 yr Grad in 0 yr Grad in 1 yr Reenroll GPA
Discontinuity 0.384*** 0.015** -0.003 -0.014** -0.001
(0.087) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
Observations 227,848 115,869 115,869 115,869 115,869
Earnings >0 Earnings Borrow at Borrow >
unsub. max unsub. max
Discontinuity 0.053*** 486.8*** -0.048*** 0.146***
(0.004) (171.4) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 115,869 115,869 115,869 115,869
NOTE: Each column has an estimate of the discontinuity in student outcomes for students
born before January 1. The estimates arise from estimating Equation 1. The regressions
also include controls for gender and race. Each discontinuity is estimated using a window
of birth dates of 100 days from January 1, which corresponds to the IK bandwidth except
in the case of attempted hours, which uses a bandwidth of 200 days. The data are admin-
istrative records of the THECB and TWC and include the 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 school
years. Standard errors are clustered on recentered birth date and are in parentheses, with
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table A3: Covariate Balance
Male White Black Hispanic
Discontinuity -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 111,793 111,793 111,793 111,793
Asian Previous grants Previous loans Previous EFC
Discontinuity -0.006** 10.31 65.84 -1092.8
(0.003) (30.04) (54.81) (2487.90)
Observations 111,793 111,793 111,793 65,633
NOTE: This tests for discontinuities in covariates for students who were born before Jan-
uary 1. Each discontinuity is estimated using a window of birth dates of 100 days from
January 1 which corresponds to the IK bandwith. Students born December 29 through
January 3 are excluded as discussed in the text. The data are administrative records of
the THECB and include the 2003–2004 to 2013–2014 school years. Standard errors are
clustered on birthdate are in parentheses, with * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table A4: Placebo Check—22-Year-Olds
Total grants Pell amount Total loans
Discontinuity 2.43 -0.513 -53.09
(24.07) (14.55) (35.44)
Observations 237,357 237,357 237,357
Reenroll 4 yr Grad in 0 yr Grad 4 in 1 yr GPA
Discontinuity 0.003 -0.007 -0.007* -0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Observations 237,357 237,357 237,357 237,357
NOTE: This tests for differences in student outcomes among students turning 22 as a
placebo test. The data are administrative records of the THECB and include the 2003–
2004 to 2013–2014 school years. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with * p<0.1
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
51
